This paper presents a model with monopolistic competition, productively heterogeneous firms, and business cycle aggregate shocks. With firm-specific productive heterogeneity, weaker firms quit when faced with a negative aggregate shock. Consequently, trade does not always increase firm-level aggregate productivity as negative shocks on the home market can be compensated for by positive shocks elsewhere. Weaker firms, which would otherwise quit in autarky, can continue to operate by exporting. Despite this, trade can still improve welfare for risk-averse consumers by reducing aggregate price fluctuations.
Introduction
Business Cycles and Firm Heterogeneity The business cycle, which exerts a profound impact on many facets of the economy, has generally not been given much consideration in international trade models. Traditional trade theories highlight the gains from trade that arise from country level di¤erences, either broadly due to technology (Ricardian) or endowment (Heckscher-Ohlin). Since these models describe the long run general equilibrium gains from trade, the business cycle is in some sense irrelevant. Perfect competition also renders the …rm irrelevant in equilibrium trade considerations. On the other hand, suppose one introduces business cycle shocks to a 'new' trade model [Paul R. Krugman (1979 Krugman ( , 1980 ] with homogenous …rms. Since …rms are homogeneous, the business cycle a¤ects all …rms symmetrically and does not therefore have any reallocation e¤ects. Any business-cycle driven reallocation of market shares can only be adequately described with a model of heterogeneous …rms.
This paper therefore asks the following question: how do business cycle shocks a¤ect heterogeneous …rms? What are the reallocative and welfare implications? How do these shocks a¤ect the production and exporting decisions of …rms? These questions are interesting and important on several counts.
To begin, trade in the context of …rm heterogeneity has received much theoretical research attention recently [Marc J. Melitz (2003) ; Andrew B. Bernard, Stephen J. Redding and Peter K. Schott (2007) -henceforth known as BRS; Melitz and Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano (2005) ] motivated by strong empirical evidence that points to the existence of persistent productivity di¤erences between exporters and non-exporters. The key contribution of the …rm heterogeneity literature is to formally model the reallocation of output and market shares between productively heterogeneous …rms. Firms below the so-called productivity cuto¤ cease to operate, ceding market shares to more productive …rms above the cuto¤.
Economists are therefore able to formalise yet another source of welfare gains through trade liberalisation, which arises by increasing the productivity cuto¤s and the transfer of market shares to more productive …rms. But since these models set out to formalise the long-run equilibrium e¤ects of trade liberalisation, the business cycle is mostly ignored. The notable exception is by Fabio Ghironi and Melitz (2004) , which microfounds the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect through heterogeneous …rms and productivity shocks. However, the authors consider only the exporting decisions of …rms but not their production decisions.
With heterogeneous …rms, it is also evident that business cycle shocks will a¤ect di¤erent …rms di¤erently, even in autarky. There are potentially interesting reallocative e¤ects of output and market shares. The macro consequence of the business cycle in an environment with heterogeneous …rms is non-trivial since a …rm's continued production through an adverse demand shock would depend on its productivity. The set of …rms that quit production in the face of adverse demand is therefore not a random selection, and there exists a systematic relationship between productivity cuto¤s and business cycle shocks 1 .
Trade between economies with asymmetric shocks would therefore present another point of interest: how would heterogeneous …rms behave and what would be the macroeconomic welfare consequences? The objective of this paper is to model the e¤ect of business cycles and trade in an analytically tractable manner.
Model Outline
The starting point of the paper is the introduction of productivity shocks into a Melitz type model. By altering the size of the market, these business cycle productivity shocks then translate into demand shocks for …rms. This paper does not consider any nominal rigidities that a¤ect …rms'ability to adjust. However, …rms have to invest in …xed assets …rst (due to production lags) before production takes place. The e¤ect of this is that …rms face an uncertain demand since they are investing before the shocks are realised 2 . Due to the heterogeneity in production costs, pro…t outcomes are no longer symmetric. For example, with a negative aggregate shock, weaker …rms will make losses while stronger ones will still make pro…ts. With a positive shock, all …rms will make pro…ts but again pro…ts will be higher for more productive …rms. Though aggregate pro…ts shift up or down depending on the expost demand shocks, there is always a 'pro…t ranking' where a more productive …rm always has a higher pro…t. Furthermore, in a general equilibrium, productivity shocks also change the available aggregate resources in the market place. As Melitz (2003) notes, " . . all the e¤ects of trade on the distribution of …rms are channelled through a second mechanism operating through the domestic factor market where …rms compete for a common resource." The …rst mechanism -namely product market competition -is "not operative . . . due to CES preferences: the price elasticity of demand for any variety does not respond to changes in the number or prices of competing varieties." 3 A similar mechanism of factor competition is at work in this paper. When faced with a negative aggregate shock, the aggregate savings (of consumers) fall. Since aggregate savings equal the gross investments into …rms'…xed costs, fewer …rms are able to invest and continue production. The upshot of this is that weaker …rms will have to quit the market, …tting the stylised fact that recessions have a greater impact on weaker …rms. In this paper however, an additional mechanism is introduced via demand uncertainty: Firms have to invest in …xed asset before demand is realised. The expected market size (in the next period) will change a …rm's decision whether to continue in the market.
Trade and Capital Market Integration Away from autarky, two processes of integration occur. The …rst is capital market integration that allows capital to be shipped between countries. The second is goods market integration that allows consumption goods to be shipped. As this paper is focused on the e¤ects of goods trade only, capital market integration is assumed to be as simple as possible. There is a perfectly competitive international market for capital to be shipped between countries and returns to capital costlessly remitted back to capital owners for consumption. This is the key assumption of the 'Footloose Capital'class of models in Economic Geography. While this may not necessarily be a robust or realistic assumption, it nevertheless allows the paper to abstract from any capital market complications that might arise and focus on the goods market instead.
It turns out that in equilibrium, even the perfect mobility of capital cannot replicate the outcome of free goods trade 4 . Why might this be so?
The presence of trade costs alter the perceived expected market size faced by monopolistically competitive …rms. In the presence of trade costs, the productivity cuto¤s of two countries cannot be equalised in some circumstances, leading to di¤erent selection e¤ects in both countries. The fact that two economies have di¤erent productivity cuto¤s is not trivial. First, it implies that capital is not optimally invested as some less e¢ cient …rms (in the country with lower productivity cuto¤) can continue production when they otherwise cannot with free trade. Secondly, it implies that the reallocative e¤ect is not maximised since some weaker …rms continue producing behind trade barriers. In the presence of trade costs, market shares are therefore not allocated in the most e¢ cient manner across economies.
What then are the bene…ts of free trade? As …rms in each country operate in a larger fully integrated market, the productivity cuto¤s in both countries are completely equalised (but may still change with di¤erent demand states). This represents the optimum deployment of capital and allocation of market shares between heterogeneous …rms and across economies. More signi…cantly, this leads to a diversi…cation effect which in equilibrium reduces price-output ‡uctuations faced by each economy in autarky. This result stems from the fact that only free trade equalises the productivity cuto¤s between countries, and allows for an equally productive set of producers to operate. The increased macroeconomic stability presents yet another source of welfare gains for the risk-averse consumer.
Limitations In this paper, business cycle shocks are introduced by way of a two-state (good or bad) Markov process. While this is more limiting compared to where productivity shocks (innovations) are normally distributed with mean zero [see Ghironi and Melitz (2004) ] 5 , the Markov process allows the paper to solve various variables in a stationary equilibrium. When analysing the e¤ects of international trade, this paper considers only a two-country setting to highlight the diversi…cation e¤ect clearly. Nevertheless, the insights can be extended to a multi-country setup. Finally, to derive analytical solutions explicitly, the paper assumes the productivity distributions to be Pareto [Ghironi and Melitz (2004) ;
2 The Model Setup
Endowments
There are L identical consumers (who are also workers) in the economy. The consumers have in…nite lives, and each is endowed with some mean level of human capital denoted by H, thereby providing a mean level of e¤ective labour force of LH.
States of the World
There are two possible states of the world, bad and good, denoted by subscript S = B or G. There is high H G in the good state and low H B in the bad state. This is the characterisation of the aggregate shock. The transition from period to period is given by a simple Markov process
re ‡ects the persistence of the shocks. To abstract from growth dynamics, the model assumes the shocks to be symmetric around the mean level
where < 1 is the size of the shock. Naturally, the average size of this economy over many periods will be LH 6 . Workers sell their labour services to the market inelastically.
Preferences
In each period t, the j consumer's utility is given by
and > 1. Good x 0 is the homogenous good, produced competitively with unit labour, costlessly traded, and used as the numeraire (P 0 = 1). Good x 1 is the di¤erentiated good, where t is the set of varieties available to the consumers at discrete period t. Furthermore, each consumer's discounted lifetime utility is given by
where < 1 is the subjective discount factor in each period. This preference speci…cation thus exhibits the 'double-diminishing' property. There is diminishing marginal utility to the consumption of each variety in any time period and also diminishing marginal utility to the number of varieties in each period. The log utility also implies that the consumers are strictly risk-averse, preferring a stable level of utility (or varieties) over time. This will be the key property that gives rise to welfare gains when countries trade since aggregate price (or output) stability is welfare enhancing.
Technology and Firms
The homogeneous good is competitively produced. Even after the opening of economies to trade, this paper assumes that the homogeneous good will be produced everywhere (incomplete specialisation), thereby pinning down the price of homogeneous good and wages everywhere to For the di¤erentiated industry, there is an exogenous mass M of exist-ing …rms with heterogeneous productivity characterised with a productivity distribution that has a cumulative distribution G(') and density function g(') 7 . Each atomistic …rm has a constant productivity ' speci…c to itself on this distribution 8 .
In every period, each …rm has a per period …xed cost f . The key requirement is that f has to be in place one period before production takes place due to production lags. If a …rm does not invest in f during this period, it will not be able to produce in the period after that. After the …xed cost is incurred, a …rm can begin production in the next period with the production function given as
where l is the labour requirement to produce q units of output.
Capital Goods
Consumers save by investing in a perfectly competitive mutual fund, which then supplies f to the …rms in return for next period's operating pro…ts as dividends to the fund. The fund then channels the dividends back to the consumers. This approach is seen in Ghironi and Melitz (2004) and it greatly simpli…es the saving-investment process of consumers. With heterogeneous …rms, each existing …rm will have a different …rm value. Considering the investment into a mutual fund this way allows one to ignore the investment choices of individual consumers. This simpli…cation means that the consumers e¤ectively own the entire portfolio of heterogeneous …rms through the mutual fund (in equal shares), and receive the same stream of dividend. In this way, one can also characterise the economy with a representative consumer who owns all the …rms in the economy.
As countries move away from autarky, this paper makes a departure from Ghironi and Melitz (2004) , which assumes that consumers in each country invest in a mutual fund that owns only the portfolio of domestic …rms. Here, the paper allows a country's savings to be invested into the …xed cost of …rms in another country, and the operating pro…ts to be costlessly remitted back to owners for consumption. This is in a sense the assumption of perfect capital mobility widely used in Footloose Capital models in New Economic Geography.
Equilibrium in Autarky
As the paper deals with a Markov type uncertainty with only two states, the equilibrium is in fact stationary -the economy switches between good or bad state equilibrium instantly once the shocks are realised, and there are no further transitional dynamics.
Consumer' s Problem
Since all consumers are identical, one can deal with the model with a representative consumer (normalising L to 1). The consumer faces a decision on how much to spend (and save) in each period given the state of the world and how much to spend on each good. In each period, the consumer simply solves the following Bellman equation with value function t (! t ; H t ) = max ln u t + t+1 (! t+1 ; H t+1 jS t ) subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint
The representative consumer holds the entire market portfolio of shares of all …rms. The …rst source of income is wage income H t . The second is the net revenue of …rms ! t returned to the consumer as a dividend. His expenditure is E t and he saves by again investing in the market portfolio of …rms with an expected return ! t+1 , suitably discounted by interest rate t . The optimisation of the Bellman equation with the log utility and Markov process give the following Euler equations
where E G and E B are the expenditures of the good and bad states, G and B are the real interest rates. From equation (1), as expenditure is higher in the good state E G > E B , the real interest rate is also higher in the bad state B > G (the real interest rates will be solved explicitly in later sections). This is a standard result -a higher real interest rate is necessary in the bad state for the consumer to be indi¤erent between current and future consumption. Since there are only two levels of aggregate expenditure, of which a constant is spent on the di¤erentiated sector, there are also only two levels of aggregate revenue in the di¤erentiated sector given by
Indirect Utility The indirect utility of the consumer in each period can be written as
where S denotes the state. The consumer's indirect utility depends on two factors -his current state-contingent expenditure E S(t) and the aggregate price level P S(t) of the di¤erentiated sector 9 . However, since the number of …rms that are producing in period t is determined in period t 1 given the production lag, the CES aggregate price level P S(t) in fact depends on the investment decisions in the previous period. For example, if today is a good state while the previous state is bad, the indirect utility is in fact given as
, where P G < P B . Though today's income is high, welfare is lower due to the higher CES aggregate price. V 
Pro…t Conditions
The productivity cuto¤ is de…ned as a productivity level ' that allows a …rm to break even in expectation with the investment into …xed cost.
A …rm with this cuto¤ productivity level is labelled as the marginal …rm. Any …rm with a productivity level below this cuto¤ will not invest in …xed assets and not produce in the next period [see Melitz (2003) 
Proposition 1 There exists a 'Pro…t Condition'for the good state P C G that provides the relationship between the expected pro…tability of a …rm and its productivity ', when the economy is hit with a positive shock.
Proof. In equilibrium, the marginal …rm with productivity ' will have expected revenue r e (' ) that recovers investment cost with interest in expectation only. This can be written as
where
is the CES optimal price, and
is the expected aggregate market size in the next period given the Markov process. Because of the CES function, the ratio of (expected) revenues between two …rms with productivity ' and ' is given as
. This allows the expected revenue of any …rm with productivity ' to be expressed as r e (') =
' '
1 r e (' ). The expected pro…t be-
. This is simpli…ed to be a function of the productivity cuto¤ only
Proposition 2 There exists a bad state Pro…t Condition P C B that provides the relationship between the expected pro…tability of a …rm and its productivity ', when the economy is hit with a negative shock.
Proof. From the previous proposition, the marginal …rm condition becomes
The expected pro…t, characterised by P C B , can be written as the function of the marginal …rm with productivity ' only. As the real interest rate is now B , P C B can be written as
Since B > G , the cost of capital is higher in the bad state, shifting the pro…t function downwards. The real interest rates will be solved explicitly in later subsections.
The Impact of Uncertainty and Shocks
Before the paper proceeds to provide the analytical solution to the equilibrium, it is useful to highlight several key facts of this equilibrium. Four realisations of ex-post pro…ts can occur even though there are only two levels of average productivity (since there are only two cuto¤s ' G and ' B ), because …rms have to make investment decisions before the shocks are realised. Actual pro…tability is therefore not only a function of productivity but is also a¤ected by ex-post demand. Measuring productivity using ex-post realisations of pro…t can therefore be misleading. Because of the lag structure, high pro…ts can be due to a positive demand shock without any change in the underlying productivity of …rms. Secondly, …rm level aggregates are now a¤ected by the relevant state. In the good state, …rms with productivity levels higher than ' G will invest f to produce in the next period. With a negative shock, the cuto¤ level increases to ' B as market conditions go from easy to tough. The result is that …rms between G(' B ) and G(' G ) will have negative expected pro…ts if they choose to stay in the market.
Since the parameters are constant, the model in fact has stationary equilibrium properties. The equilibrium shifts to the good state or the bad state without any further dynamics. This allows the relationship between the numbers of …rms to be written as
When a bad state comes after a good one, a proportion of …rms
will not invest in f and quit the market. The business cycle therefore introduces a selection e¤ect where only a stronger and smaller subset of …rms is productive enough to continue investing through the bad state.
The …nal point to make here is that …rms below ' G will never invest since they can never recover the …xed cost.
Aggregate Resource Constraints
The aggregate resource constraint for the good state can be written as
The terms on the left hand side are total wage income H(1 + ) where is the size of the aggregate shock, and dividend E G which is the operating pro…ts of …rms producing in the current period (they invested f previously) 10 . The left hand side thus represents total income ‡ow to the representative worker. The corresponding expression for the bad state can be written as
This paper has done away with the Melitz exit mechanism by assuming a …xed number of …rms M on the distribution G(') [see Thomas Chaney (2006) ]. This allows one to write M G and M B explicitly as a function of M and the respective cuto¤s only
This is consistent with equation (7) provided earlier.
Consider the good state aggregate constraint in equation (8) . It can be re-written as
By writing the equation this way, the left hand side of the equation is simply the aggregate savings (net of expenditure). By making use of 10 See Appendix A:2.8.1 for the distribution of revenues and pro…ts across …rms. The proofs show that aggregate operating pro…ts (which ‡ow back to consumers as dividend) are functions of aggregate expenditures only, independent of the number of …rms. In other words, the distribution of market shares across …rms does not a¤ect the aggregate resource constraints. equation (10) , the mass of …rms investing in the good state becomes
Similarly, the mass of …rms investing in the bad state becomes
In short, the mass of …rms that can carry on investing is a function of the net available resource saved in the economy in each period divided by the per …rm capital requirement. These two equations therefore allow the productivity cuto¤s to be pinned down once the aggregate expenditure (and hence savings) in each state is known. Since aggregate savings are smaller in a bad state, the productivity cuto¤ ' B must be higher.
Equilibrium Characterisation
The equilibrium is a set of variables {' G , ' B , E G , E B , G , B } that satisfy the pair of Euler equations in (1), resource constraints (11) and (12), and the marginal …rm conditions (3) and (5) . Making use of the two Euler equations in (1), the ratio of expenditures can be written as
= , where > 1 is the ratio of good to bad state expenditure ( will be solved later). The above equation can be written as
This gives the ratio of interest rates as
which is greater than one.
Dividing equation (5) by (3) gives the following relationship
This relationship can be simpli…ed in two steps. Firstly, the de…nition of aggregate prices -which is a function of …rm mass and average productivity -can be substituted into the above equation. Secondly, one can make use of the convenient relationship that arise from the pareto distribution -that the ratio of average to cuto¤ productivity is a constant 11 .
This constant is therefore cancelled out on the left hand side of the above equation. Together, these simplify the relationship to
By substituting the ratio of interest rates from equation (13), the ratio of …rm mass can be solved as
Dividing equation (11) by (12) gives
With the left hand side to be exactly from equation (14), one can simplify the above relationship and solve for
as a function of shock parameter only. Therefore, the ratio of expenditures
and ratio of …rm mass
are exactly the ratio of productivity shocks .
From the bad state Euler equation
With the pareto distribution,
Multiplying across by E G gives = B [ + (1 )]. This allows the real interest rate to be solved as a function of parameters only
Similarly, the good state interest rate can solved as
With the solution to the interest rates, one can solve for E G and E B by plugging B and G into the marginal …rm equations in equations (5) and (3), and then making use of the …rm constraint conditions in equations (9) and (8) . These will provide four equations to solve for the remaining endogenous variables E G , E B , M G , and M B . Nevertheless, because of the complexity of the equations, this method is algebraically cumbersome.
There is a quicker way to solve for the variables. Suppose that = 0 (no shocks). In equilibrium, there will only be one interest rate since
1 , there will only be one level of expenditure E = E G = E B , and one constant …rm mass M = M G = M B . The marginal …rm condition from equations (5) and (3) collapse to one single equation
simply re ‡ects the nice property of the pareto distribution where the ratio of average to cuto¤ productivity is a constant. Without aggregate shocks, there is also only one aggregate constraint
By making the substitution of M f into the previous relationship, one can solve for
This is the solution to the expenditure level in the absence of shocks ( = 0). Since any shocks are symmetric around the mean level of H, and that 
Note that the levels of expenditures depend on parameters only. Firm level variables such as productivity average or cuto¤ productivities, or aggregate variables such as interest rates, have no bearing at all on the level of expenditures. Fluctuation in expenditures is purely a result of with no other in ‡uences. With the solutions to the level of aggregate expenditure, one can easily solve for the mass of …rms using the aggregate constraints in equations (9) and (8)
Aggregate Prices and Welfare Implication The expression of aggregate price is
where M S is the number of producing …rms with state S = G or B, and ' S is the average productivity de…ned as
With the pareto distribution, the average productivity becomes a function of the cuto¤ only'
where k is the parameter that characterises the shape of the distribution. Using the de…nition of the aggregate prices, the ratio of bad to good CES prices is given as
Following a bad state (due to the lag structure), there are fewer …rms and the e¤ect of this is to increase the CES aggregate price. This e¤ect is seen in the term
1 which is greater than 1. However, the average productivity following a bad state rises since only a smaller subset of …rms above ' B survive. With …rm heterogeneity, there are fewer …rms but they are of higher productivity, thereby resulting in an opposite e¤ect on the aggregate price level. This is seen by the ratio
which is less than 1. Another way of seeing this is to realise that …rm heterogeneity softens the e¤ect of underlying shocks because the …rms that stop investing f in a bad state are the least productive ones.
Despite the opposing e¤ects, there is no ambiguity on the price level with the pareto distribution. Using the fact that
M from equation (10) given the pareto distribution, the productivity cuto¤s are explicitly solved as
Substituting these into equation (21), the aggregate price ratio can be solved as
which is strictly greater than 1 (in other words P B > P G ). Aggregate CES prices are always counter-cyclical. A good state leads to lower prices while a bad state leads to higher prices, amplifying the e¤ect of the business cycle shocks. The larger the shock, the larger the ‡uctuation in aggregate prices and welfare.
Diagrammatic Representation Diagrammatically, the equilibrium can be illustrated in Figure 1 12 . The pro…t conditions here are forward looking. Once a …rm has invested …xed cost f in the last period, it will de…nitely produce in the current period because of the CES demands; it does not care about cuto¤s. However, the …rm has to decide whether to quit or to continue investing f . The Y-axis therefore represents not realised average pro…ts …rms earn but expected pro…ts. The X-axis represents the cuto¤ level of productivity below which …rms will choose not to invest in f and quit the market.
Therefore, while there is an exogenous mass of M heterogeneous …rms along the entire distribution of G('), the number of …rms that stay in the market is endogenous. Not all are su¢ ciently productive to stay in the market given the cost of capital. Since aggregate savings are higher in the good state, there will be a larger mass of …rms that will invest in f as compared to the bad state M G > M B . The larger the shock, the greater is the …rm mass ratio , which results in a larger aggregate price ‡uctuation. A Simple Numerical Example This subsection provides a simple numerical example to the equilibrium just characterised. The parameters used here are not meant to be realistic as the purpose of this exercise is simply to demonstrate the equilibrium e¤ects in the presence of shocks. The productivity distribution G(') is assumed to be pareto with support at 0.1 and shape of k = 4. The rest of the parameters are provided in Table 1 . The equilibrium at two levels of shocks are given in Table 2 . Table 2 illustrates a clear point. The larger the aggregate shock , the larger the di¤erences between good and bad state variables. There is greater ‡uctuation of the price level between P B and P G . Note that the aggregate prices are counter cyclical -a good state leads to lower prices while a bad state leads to higher prices. Given the per period indirect utility in equation (2), the counter-cyclical price ‡uctuations therefore amplify the e¤ect of expenditures E G and E B , resulting in welfare loss for the risk-averse consumer.
Opening to Trade
Despite …rm heterogeneity softening the impact of fewer …rms investing in a bad state, there continues to be ‡uctuation in the aggregate prices caused by business cycle shocks. The important welfare question is: can trade integration between two economies reduce the ‡uctuation?
In answering this question, a few simplifying assumptions should be made. Firstly, the consumers'expenditures in both economies continue to be uncorrelated after opening to trade. There is no insurance or risksharing between consumers of both economies 13 . The implied assumption here is that the international capital market exists for …rms only, it does not facilitate borrowing or lending for consumption smoothing. This assumption greatly simpli…es the characterisation of the trade equilibrium since it ignores the potential interactions between consumers of two di¤erent countries. For the …rms, the e¤ect of this assumption is that aggregate demands are uncorrelated across countries. This is not a wholly realistic assumption, but is nevertheless well supported empirically. Indeed, the lack of correlation between consumption of countries is just one of the six major puzzles of international macroeconomics [see Maurice Obstfeld and Kennedy Rogo¤ (2000)].
Secondly, there is a perfectly competitive international capital market that allows savings in one economy to be invested towards …xed cost f in another, and net revenue costless remitted back to capital owners for consumption. Consumers (savers) in one economy can invest into and become owners of …rms in the other economy in return for next period's pro…ts.
Thirdly, the paper considers only two-country trade for the ease of exposition and to bring out the analytical results more clearly. Nevertheless, as the reader shall see, the insights can be easily extended to multi-country trade.
Two Country Model
Two economies are identical in every way -labour size L, average productivity H, preferences, production technology and productivity distribution. They also have the same mass of …rms M on the same productivity distribution G('). However, both have independent aggregate shocks even after they are open to trade.
Proposition 3
With free trade, both economies will always have a common productivity cuto¤.
Proof. The proof can be made by contradiction. With free trade, every …rm has complete market access into both markets wherever they are located. With free trade, the levels of competitive intensity (characterised by the trade weighted CES price aggregates) are also the same in both locations. Therefore, a …rm has to be indi¤erent between the two locations. Suppose one location (labelled as Home) has a productivity cuto¤ of ' H while the other (labelled as Foreign) has a cuto¤ of ' F such that ' H 6 = ' F , a …rm that lies between ' H and ' F is above one cuto¤ (profitable) and below the other cuto¤ (unpro…table). There exists a mass of …rms between ' H and ' F that will not be indi¤erent since they can invest f in one of the market with positive expected pro…ts. This violates the de…nition of productivity cuto¤s (this proposition will be given a further formal proof later).
Open Economy with Trade Costs

Iceberg Trade Cost
Variable trade costs are introduced as the standard iceberg trading cost of > 1 for every unit of good shipped across the economies. With only variable trade cost, the price of export is simply a mark-up over the price of domestic sales p X = p.
Proposition 4
In the presence of iceberg trade costs, the productivity cuto¤s between countries cannot be equalised when they are faced with asymmetric shocks.
Proof. The paper …rst sketch a intuitive proof, with the formal proof provided later in the next sub-section. Suppose Home and Foreign economies have asymmetric shocks (Home in a bad state and Foreign in a good state with no loss of generality) and that cuto¤s are equalised ' H = ' F . If cuto¤s are equalised, the mass of …rms investing f is the same in both locations given the assumption of a …xed number (or density) of …rms along the same productivity distribution. If the cuto¤s are the same at both locations, the aggregate price indices will be equal at both locations whatever the level of trade costs. Since Home is in a bad state, the expected aggregate expenditure, taking into account both domestic and export revenue subjected to trade cost, is
This is strictly smaller than the expected aggregate expenditure of the Foreign economy
since it is in a good state and < 1 because of trade costs. If ' H de…nes the …rm having zero expected pro…t if it invests f at Home, a …rm with this productivity must have positive expected pro…ts in Foreign given the larger expected market size there. This violates the de…nition of ' F as the productivity cuto¤.
Equilibrium Characterisation With Iceberg Cost
This subsection proceeds to characterise the productivity cuto¤s in the presence of iceberg trade cost. The impact of …xed export costs f X will be brie ‡y discussed in Appendix A.
Symmetric Shocks
Proposition 5 The productivity cuto¤, common to both economies, is ' G when they are in the good state; and is ' B when both economies are in the bad state.
Proof. Consider the case when both economies are in the bad state. Whatever the level of , both economies have the expected aggregate revenues since they are hit with symmetric shocks. Furthermore, both economies will have low aggregate savings, with the same aggregate resource constraint in equation (12) . Hence, there is no capital ‡ow between the economies. This pins down a common productivity cuto¤ ' B . The same reasoning applies when both economies are in the good state.
Asymmetric Shocks
The only case where iceberg cost results in different cuto¤s is when Home and Foreign are hit with asymmetric shocks. In this case, aggregate savings in both economies are di¤erent and there is the possibility of capital ‡ows a¤ecting the productivity cuto¤s in each economy. Without a loss of generality, suppose Home economy has the bad state while Foreign has the good state, and that trade cost is positive > 1. Given E H = E B and E F = E G 14 , the trade equilibrium is a set of variables {' H , ' F , M } that satisfy the following conditions, where M is the cost of capital faced by the …rms in the Home and Foreign economy respectively. First, the marginal …rms with productivities ' H and ' F must have zero pro…ts in their respective locations. This gives the pair of equations
are the optimal prices charged by the marginal …rms, P H and P F are the trade weighted CES price aggregates. By substituting the expressions for the CES price aggregates and cancelling out some terms, the above equations become simpli…ed to
Secondly, given the global pool of savings which is the resource constraint, the total number of …rms is given as
Together, these provide three conditions to solve for {' H , ' F , M } given E G and E B . Note that it must be the case that ' H > ' F in equilibrium since there is a smaller set of producers for the Home country (which is in a bad state) 15 .
The Diversi…cation E¤ect with Free Trade
Given the characterisation of the equilibrium with costly trade (positive iceberg costs), it is easy to show the equilibrium e¤ects under free trade. With equations (24) and (25), one arrives at the following equality
Note that even though trade cost is positive, the two economies continue to have a common cost of capital M because capital is completely mobile. That is, the last unit of capital f invested must recover the same expected amount M f in both economies even though they have asymmetric shocks. Therefore, H = F = M in equilibrium even in the presence of positive trade cost. The fact that productivity cuto¤s are not equalised is due to trade cost altering the degree of capital ‡ows between the two economies when they have asymmetric shocks. With free trade ( = 1), the aggregate prices -given by the denominators -are equal. The expected revenues in brackets also become equal. Together, these imply that ' H = ' F even in the presence of asymmetric shocks. A Home …rm will be a perfect substitute for the foreign …rm. In other words, free trade will result in a common cuto¤ ' M even with asymmetric shocks to both economies. This is the formal proof to Proposition 3. The e¤ects of free trade can be seen in Figure 2 .
This result can also be inferred from the …rm mass equations in (20) . These give the …rm masses in equilibrium with the good and bad state, which is a function of shocks and other parameters only. In a fully integrated economy with free trade, it simply means that the shocks cancel out. With free trade, the …rm mass that is common to both economies becomes
Since there is a common …rm mass, there is a common cuto¤ ' M [anal-ogous to the relationships speci…ed in equation (10)] 16 .
From equation (23), the ratio of aggregate prices is a function of productivity cuto¤s only. Denoting free trade variables with superscript F T , the price ratios become
denotes the aggregate price when both economies are faced with a negative shock (analogous de…nition for P F T G ) 17 . With asymmetric shocks, the productivity cuto¤ becomes ' M for both economies (where ' B > ' M > ' G ) given free trade. As the shocks are cancelled out, the aggregate price level with asymmetric shocks P F T M therefore lies between P
F T B
and P
F T
G . There are now two sources of gains from trade. Firstly there is an expansion of varieties leading to lower aggregate prices and higher welfare. Secondly, there is a reduction in the probability that extreme price levels are reached. This reduces the variance in the aggregate price level and the ‡uctuation in real income, thereby representing a welfare gain from diversi…cation for the risk-averse consumer. This is a gain from trade above and beyond the expansion of variety e¤ect.
Free trade therefore results in the optimal allocation of market shares for there will always be an equally productive subset of …rms producing in each economy and selling across markets. The result is that productivity cuto¤s are completely equalised even as countries face asymmetric shocks.
When economies are hit with asymmetric shocks, there is essentially a diversi…cation equilibrium. For example, suppose the Home economy is in a bad state. Under autarky, the cuto¤ productivity would have been ' B . However, if the trading partner Foreign is in a good state, Home's cuto¤ productivity falls to ' M with free trade. In other words, some …rms that would have quit a domestic negative shock at Home in autarky will now continue to produce, as expected pro…ts from exporting more than compensate for the expected domestic loss. Aggregate …rm-level productivity therefore does not always increase with trade.
Finally, there is a subtle implication from the price ratio
. The parameter k characterises the level of …rm heterogeneity. 16 In the presence of trade cost, the …rm mass is always larger in the country with the positive shock since the expected market size is bigger. The economy with the negative shock will have a smaller …rm mass and higher price aggregate. Without free trade, aggregate prices are not equalised with asymmetric shocks. Given that consumers are risk-averse, this is welfare-reducing. 17 Note that since both economies are in the same state, the cuto¤s are unchanged from the autarky counterparts, which are ' B for the bad state and ' G for the good state.
A smaller k implies that …rms are more heterogenous while a larger k implies that …rms are more homogenous. A decrease in k would lead to an increase in k+1 k ( 1) , propagating the aggregate price ‡uctuations. In other words, if …rms are more heterogeneous, the net e¤ect (after accounting for …rm entry and changes in aggregate productivity) is greater price ‡uctuation. This suggests that the diversi…cation gains from trade are higher when …rms are more heterogeneous.
Why Iceberg Trade Cost Matters: Comparison with Melitz Model
In the Melitz model with the absence of …xed export cost, the passage from autarky to free trade (by falling from in…nity to 1) increases welfare through the CES price aggregates, with no further impact on …rm level variables. The reason for this is that a fall in increases local competitive intensity through the price index but also increases export revenue, leaving the …rm exactly indi¤erent.
However, the level is crucial here and a¤ects the productivity cuto¤s. The key here is to realise that Melitz presents a model which is a long run stable equilibrium of countries of symmetric sizes, "Firms correctly anticipate this stable aggregate environment when making all relevant decisions. The analysis then focuses on the long run e¤ects of trade and the relative behaviour and performance of …rms with di¤er-ent productivity levels." In that model, both consumption demand and investment into …rms are constant. The presence of iceberg cost therefore does not have any further e¤ect since it preserves the homotheticity amongst all …rms.
In this paper, even though both economies have a long run average size of LH, each of them ‡uctuates around two states de…ned by the Markov process. The pool of aggregate savings in each economy changes according to the shocks, thereby changing the resource available for investment, and in the process altering the survivability conditions in di¤erent states.
Cross Border Capital Flow
Given that aggregate savings are not the same when the countries are faced with assymetric shocks, there will be cross border capital ‡ow.
Through its e¤ects on expected market potentials, changes the incentive for cross-border capital ‡ows. A lower provides higher incentive for the high savings economy (good state) to invest into the low savings economy (bad state), until the productivity cuto¤s are completely equalised with free trade. Conversely, a higher trade cost creates a divergence between the perceived market sizes when the economies are hit with asymmetric shocks and reduces the diversi…cation e¤ect. Trade liberalisation therefore dampens di¤erences in productivity cuto¤s between two economies when they are hit with asymmetric shocks, leading to lower price-output ‡uctuations.
The key point is this: free capital mobility, in the presence of positive trade costs, cannot equalise the productivity cuto¤s between two economies when they are hit with asymmetric shocks. Therefore, free capital mobility alone cannot replicate free trade outcomes. Since productivity cuto¤s are unequal with asymmetric shocks and positive trade costs, market shares are not allocated in the most e¢ cient way between heterogeneous …rms across the two economies. Only with free trade will there be optimal allocation of market shares between productively heterogeneous …rms across countries -that is, an equally productive subset of producers in each country (above a common productivity cuto¤ of ' M when there is asymmetric shocks) will stay in the market.
Extension to Output and Multiple Countries
In the setup of the model, the paper has modelled welfare changes to the consumer through the impact of trade on the CES price aggregates. However, there is an simple conceptual extension to output. If one considers the di¤erentiated sector as an immediate sector supplying a …nal competitive sector as in the Ethier production function [see also Anthony J. Venables (1996) ], the smaller price ‡uctuation shown here directly translates into smaller output ‡uctuation of the …nal sector. Free trade therefore reduces output ‡uctuation in this interpretation. So long as the consumer is risk-averse, the lower ‡uctuation of price-output will be a source of welfare gain.
Furthermore, if a large number of countries with uncorrelated shocks are engaged in free trade, all of them will converge to ' M , completely stabilising aggregate price-output across all economies. Except to note that this result is obvious from the Central Limit Theorem, this will not be given any formal proof.
Conclusion
This paper has built on recent trade and …rm heterogeneity literature, in particular the aggregation properties of Melitz (2003) in the presence of …rm heterogeneity. Real Business Cycles type aggregate productivity shocks, with consumers who optimise inter-temporally, are introduced into a setting where …rms have to invest in …xed assets before the realisation of the shocks. This model therefore makes the …rm's problem more realistic compared to traditional trade models.
Without …rm heterogeneity, a negative shock would result in all …rms making losses, thereby rendering any between-…rms analysis meaningless. As it is now possible to solve for market and …rm level outcomes in the presence of …rm heterogeneity, it has become meaningful to analyse the reallocative impact of such shocks. Di¤erent …rms will be a¤ected di¤er-ently while still allowing for market aggregates to be solved analytically.
When trade is not totally free, the productivity cuto¤s cannot be equalised, and some producers are shielded by trade barriers and will continue to have positive market shares. With free trade, productivity cuto¤s are always equalised in both economies in a full diversi…cation outcome -which means that an equally productive subset of producers remain in the market. Nevertheless, the diversi…cation equilibrium also implies that aggregate …rm-level productivity does not always increase with trade. Weak companies that would have quit in a negative demand shock in autarky can continue to operate given diversi…cation possibilities.
Despite this, the model o¤ers a comforting result for trade economists by identifying another source of trade gains. The key to unlocking the insight from the model lies in understanding that opening to trade results in smaller ‡uctuation in the aggregate price levels and may therefore raise the welfare of risk-averse consumers.
Appendix
Distribution of Aggregate Revenues and Pro…ts
This subsection highlights the distribution of aggregate revenues and pro…ts across …rms. It will show that aggregate revenues are independent of the number of existing …rms. The stream of dividend to the consumers, which depends on aggregate revenues only, is therefore also una¤ected by the number of …rms. This shows that the good and bad state resource constraints in equations (8) and (9) are also independent of …rm level considerations.
The consumer is forward looking. Once the current state is realised, his adjustment to E G or E B is instant, pinning down the current period's market size or aggregate revenue for the industry (R G or R B ). However, the revenue per …rm depends on the number who invested f in the previous period, which depends on the last period's realised state. There could either be M G or M B …rms investing f previously, who will share revenue this period
where R G;B denotes the average per …rm revenue conditioned on a previously bad state (analogous for R G;G ). Since M G > M B , the per …rm revenue is higher when there are fewer competitors R G;B > R G;G . Similarly for the bad state
where R B;B > R B;G . Therefore, conditioning out the current state, average revenue is always higher when the previous state is bad. Since the ratio of average productivity is directly related to the ratio of average productivity (to the power of 1), this shows that average productivity of …rms is higher following a bad state.
This result shows that ' B > ' G . Conditioned on the current state, average pro…t is therefore also higher if the previous state is bad.
Per …rm pro…t is higher following a bad state To develop this idea more formally, one can show that
It does not matter what the previous state is, aggregate revenue R G depends on only the current state. Furthermore, operating pro…t will also be R G if today is a good state. Similarly
This establishes the following inequalities
Since the consumers optimise instantly, R G and R B are pinned down immediately. However, the number of …rms selling in this period has the lag e¤ect of investing f the previous period. Aggregate revenue is therefore shared among the mass of …rms determined in the previous period, and the market shares allocated as such. However, aggregate revenues are una¤ected by the number of …rms since R G;B = R G;G (good state) and R B;B = R B;G (bad state). The stream of dividend for consumers in each state is therefore also una¤ected by the number of …rms.
Equilibrium Characterisation with Fixed Export Cost
The …rm heterogeneity literature is motivated by the empirical evidence that only a small and productive subset of …rms engage in exporting activities. The presence of iceberg trade cost alone does not create this export partitioning, due to the CES preferences. In order to achieve export partitioning, a …xed export cost f X has to be introduced. This paper assumes that f X has exactly the same conditions attached to fit is funded through aggregate savings and has to be invested one period before export can take place. For exporters to be a small and more productive subset of all …rms, there must exist …rms with productivity below ' that …nd it pro…table to operate domestically (with domestic revenue r D ) but not export (thereby foregoing revenue r X ). The two inequalities therefore become r D (') f > 0 r D (') + r X (') f f X < 0 where r X (') = 1 r D (') due to the CES preference. Together, the partitioning condition implies that f < 1 f X which says that the combination of iceberg cost and …xed export cost must be high enough to deter some …rms from exporting. De…ne ' X as the marginal …rm that just breaks even through exporting. The probability that a …rm is strong enough to export is the conditional probability of a …rm having a distribution above ' X . This conditional probabilitỹ p X is given asp
Note that r D (' H ) = H f and r X (' HX ) = r D (' HX ) = H f X . Taking ratios of the two gives the following relationship
' H which says that the export cuto¤ ' HX is a function of domestic cuto¤ ' H only. This allows the conditional export probabilityp X to be determined as a function of parameters only. Suppose Home and Foreign are in a good state. The aggregate resource constraint from equation (26) becomes modi…ed as
In other words, global aggregate savings have to be used to fund …xed cost f as well as the the f X requirements of exporters. By inspecting equation (A3) and comparing it with equation (26), it is clear that the e¤ect of …xed export cost will shift ' G rightwards (higher). The effect of f X creates another source of resource competition. As exporters demand f X , there will be fewer …rms in equilibrium and productivity cuto¤s will have to increase. Similar analytical reasoning can be applied to when both economies are in a bad state or when they have asymmetric shocks. The e¤ect of …xed export cost will always push productivity cuto¤s higher. Assuming that export partitioning holds, the conditional probability of exportingp HX is strictly less than 1. The e¤ects of trade liberalisation (as characterised by a fall in ) can be seen from the above equation. As falls, the conditional probability of exporting increases. This increases the denominator of equation (A3), leading to an increase in the productivity cuto¤s ' G through the competition of resource.
